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Slavery and the Judges of Loyalist New Brunswick
D. G. BELL*
Why did the judges of New Brunswick's Supreme Court twice (1800, 
1805) uphold the lawfulness of Negro slavery when they might, without 
unconvenience, have abolished it? Why did they deliberately reject the 
impulse towards abolition that had triumphed throughout the rest of the 
North Atlantic world? This paper addresses these issues in the context of 
the general legal debate on slavery in Loyalist New Brunswick.
En 1800-1805, les juges de la Cour Suprême du Nouveau-Brunsunck 
ont affirmé la légalité sur l'esclavage des noirs lorsqu'ils auraient 
pu sans inconvénient l'abolir. Pourquoi ont-ils intentionnellement rejette' 
l’abolition qui a triomphé à travers le reste du monde Nord-Atlantique. 
Dans un contexte général du débat légal, le papier s'adresse sur la 
question d'esclavage dans un Nouveau-Brunswick Loyaliste.
INTRODUCTION
O n two occasions — in 1800 an d  in 1805-06 —  the Loyalist ju d g e s  
o f  New B runsw ick’s S u p rem e  C o u rt w ere co n fro n ted  with one  o f  the  
m ost vexatious issues in the W estern  legal trad itio n : w h eth er slavery was 
to  be held lawful in th e  absence o f  express sta tu to ry  estab lishm ent. O n 
one  side o f  the  question  was the  w eight o f  philosophical, relig ious an d  
ju r isp ru d e n tia l ra tionalization  from  earliest reco rd ed  tim e. O n  the o th e r  
side was the  e ig h teen th -cen tu ry  revolu tion  in ed u ca ted  op in ion  tha t had  
a lread y  d o o m ed  th e  in s titu tio n  in n e ig h b o u r in g  ju risd ic tio n s in 
B ritish N orth  A m erica and  the  U nited  S tates, and  th a t w ould soon en d
*Bairisu-i. of Hanson. Hashey, Fredericton. The author grateful!) acknowledges the financial support of 
the O'Brie n foundation during the preparation o f an earlier version of this paper.
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the slave trade in the whole British Empire. It was thus entirely open to 
the New Brunswick Supreme Court to “make[e] the law for the 
occasion”.* In choosing to uphold slavery when they might without 
inconvenience have chosen abolition, the judges deliberately rejected the 
trend o f contemporary opinion throughout the North Atlantic world. 
Although this may have had little impact on the real condition o f the 
province’s slaves it does afford striking evidence of the deeply 
conservative mentality of New Brunswick’s judges and, by extension, of 
the governing elite of which they were a central part.
The existence of Negro slavery during the early decades of New 
Brunswick’s colonial life has long been well known. No aspect o f the 
province’s legal history has attracted greater attention.2 The question 
has, however, generally been treated either as a sort of historical 
curiosity o r as an un fo rtu n a te  episode in the developm ent o f the 
province’s Black community. This paper will present a new and broader 
reconstruction o f the legal debate on slavery in New Brunswick. It will 
attempt to set the controversy against its proper historical background 
and suggest why, when they might have chosen abolition, the New 
Brunswick judges staunchly reaffirmed a social order in which slavery 
had a part.
THE ABOLITIONIST IMPULSE
Throughout most of Western history the legal and moral propriety 
of slavery was without serious question. It was an institution practised by 
the ancient Greeks and Romans, recognized in the Bible, approved by 
the leading classical and Christian writers, and sanctioned by the general 
usage o f nations. Yet between the 1780’s and the 1860’s, first the slave 
trade and then slavery itself were abolished in the United Kingdom, 
United States, and British North America. Probably the chief cause of 
this revolution in sentiment among the influential classes in the North 
Atlantic world was the propagation o f a theory of natural rights.
The list of luminaries whose work contraposes Negro slavery to the 
rights of man under nature reads like a roll call of the Enlightenment: 
Locke, Montesquieu, Hutcheson, Smith, Rousseau, Blackstone, the
‘Chipman to Blowers, 27 February 1800: Public Archives of Canada (hereinafter P.A.C.) Lawrence 
Collection, M.G. 23 Dl, Vol. 6.
*J.W. Lawrence, Foot-Prmts; or Incidents m [iA*] History o f New Brunswick (Saint John, 1883), at 57-8; W.
G. MacFarlane, Fredencton History: Two Centuries o f Romance, War, Prwation and Struggle (1893) 
(Non-Entity: Woodstock, 1981), at 52; W.O. Raymond, “The Negro in New Brunswick", (1893) 1 Neith 
27 at 33; T.W. Smith, "The Slave in Canada", (1898) 10 Coll. N.S. His. Soc. 3 at 100-10; D.A. Jack, "The 
Loyalists and Slavery in New Brunswick" (1898) Proc. Royal Soc. of Canada Ser. II, Vol. IV 137; J.W. 
Lawrence, The Judges of New Brunswick and then Times (Saint John, 1907), at 71-6; J.A. Hannay, 1 History 
of New Brunswick (Saint John, 1909), at 221-23; P.A. Ryder, Ward Chipman, United Empire [iic] Loyalist 
(M.A. Thesis: U.N.B., 1958), at 67-9; W.S. MacNutt, New Brunswick A History: 1784-1867 (MacMillan: 
Toronto, 1963), at 83; Robin Winks, The Blacks in Canada (McGill-Queen's: Montreal, 1971), at 107; 
W.A. Spray, The Blacks m New Brunswick (Brunswick: Fredericton, 1972), at 23-5.
SLAVERY AND THE LOYAUSTS 1 1
authors of L'Encyclopédie.3 Although historians generally point to John 
Locke’s formulation o f the first principles o f civil society as the 
intellectual well-spring o f much of the libertarian rhetoric o f the era of 
the American and French revolutions, it was the work of Montesquieu 
and Blackstone which had the greater direct impact on the issue of 
slavery. Montesquieu himself was widely read among the influential, but 
the key to the widespread awareness o f his theory that slavery was 
without justification in natural law was its wholesale reproduction in 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69). While 
Blackstone’s argum ents oil this head were neither original nor 
unequivocal he wrote in a ‘general and pronounced anti-slavery tone” 
and incorporated Montesquieu’s demolition of the traditional pro-slavery 
case in a widely-circulated work o f the utmost respectability.4 His 
identification of English law with the law of nature and his 
corresponding rejection of “pure and proper” slavery were unmistaka­
ble.
Blackstone’s influence in the late eighteenth-century North Atlantic 
world can hardly be overemphasized, especially as regards North 
America. The Commentaries were more than the lawyer’s vade mecum; 
more even than “an essential part o f every Gentleman’s library”.5 Their 
publication came at a time o f intense constitutional debate in both 
Britain and her North American colonies, and Blackstone’s treasury of 
common law principles was an essential tool in that debate. The 
influence of the Commentaries can be gauged from the fact that the 
dem and was great enough to justify trans-Atlantic reprintings, so that 
the num ber of copies sold was comparable to the sale in Britain itself.6
Although the vogue of natural rights reasoning is the most 
perceptible factor in the rise o f anti-slavery sentiment, students of the 
abolitionist impulse have linked the transformation of public opinion to 
several other intellectual currents in the late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century world. In the economic sphere Adam Smith and his 
followers challenged the proposition that slavery was a necessary or 
uncommonly efficient way of extracting money from the plantation 
colonies.7 In the religious sphere the abolitionist advocacy of the North 
American Quakers and the English Wesleyan Methodists is well known. 
The Wesleyan stance, in particular, can be viewed as just one
*Not all o f the persons named were abolitionists, but their works were o f notable service in the 
abolitionist cause.
‘Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition (Humanities: Atlantic Highlands, U.S.A.. 
1975), at 114-15. Anstey adds that, “Unoriginal though Blackstone’s arguments were, they came over as 
compulsive conclusions from premises o f pristine simplicity, whilst we must also remind ourselves o f the 
obvious — that Blackstone was lecturing and writing in English".
‘Edward Christian, "Advertisement” to the 15th edition (London, 1809) of the Commentaries.
•Gareth Jones, The Sovereignty o f the Law (U. Toronto: Toronto, 1973), at xvii-viii.
’David Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Cornell U.P.: Ithaca, 1966), at 434-35.
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m anifesta tion  o f  the  g row th  o f  the  rational, a rm in ian  concep t o f  a G od 
o f  love.
It was the development o f a philosophy of benevolence, of the idea that God 
pursued his object of stimulating happiness not by coersion but through 
freedom of will, of the idea of history as progressive, which made it possible 
to attack American slavery as unchristian, inhumane and ripe for change.8
T h e  com bined  force o f  these c u rre n ts  in n a tu ra l righ ts theoriz ing , 
in econom ic th o u g h t, an d  in relig ious ou tlook  was such th a t by th e  last 
th ird  o f  th e  e ig h teen th  cen tu ry  the  tide  o f  public op in io n  was 
perceptib ly  ru n n in g  against slavery, an d  especially the  slave trad e . T h is  
was particu larly  tru e  in B ritain  an d  the  n o r th e rn  o f  h e r  N o rth  A m erican 
colonies, w here  slaves w ere relatively few and  the  o rg an s  o f  public 
o p in ion  relatively advanced . In  the  fo rm ula tion  o f  the  lead ing  s tu d en t o f  
th e  British slave trade:
[T]he context of received wisdom had so altered by the 1780’s that educated 
men and the political nation, provided they had no direct interest in the slave 
system, would be likely to regard slavery and the slave trade as morally 
condemned, and as no longer philosophic ally defensible.®
B etw een 1780 an d  1807 this a lte red  public sen tim en t was reflec ted  in 
legislative an d  judicial action  against slavery in B ritain  herself an d  in m any 
o f  h e r  c u rre n t an d  fo rm e r N o rth  A m erican  colonies; bu t no t in New 
B runsw ick.
In Great Britain
T h e  abolition  o f  N egro  slavery in 1833 has com m only  been  hailed 
as o n e  o f  the  noblest ach ievem ents in British history; an d , w hen one 
recalls tha t B ritain  abolished slavery th ree  decades ea rlie r than  m any o f  
the  A m erican  States th e re  is som e basis fo r  such a view. B ut the encom ia 
still generally  ex ten d ed  to  th e  British reco rd  on  slavery probably  arise 
no t so m uch from  th e  en d in g  o f  th e  slave trad e  in 1807 an d  the 
abolition  o f  the  institu tion  itself in th e  1830’s as from  the  no tion  th a t 
slavery was never legally to le ra ted  w ithin the  b o rd e rs  o f  th e  M other 
C o u n try  herse lf, an d  th a t L o rd  M ansfie ld’s ce leb ra ted  decision in 
Somerset v. Stewart (1772)10 pu t the  m a tte r  beyond d o ub t. In  a 
characteristic  exp ression  o f  this still w idely-accepted m isconception 
R eginald  C o u p lan d  w rote  that a f te r  M ansfield’s decision "all slaves in 
E ng land  . . . w ere recognized  as free  m en ”.11
"Duncan MacLeod, Slavery, Rare, and the American Revolution (Cambridge: New York. 1974), ai 3.
*Supra, footnote 4, at 95.
,0(1772) Lofft I; 98 E.R. 499.
"Reginald Coupland. The British Anti-Slavery Movement (London. 1933), at 55.
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Viewed in strictly legal terms, however, Somerset's case is only the 
most notable of a long series o f highly contradictory English decisions 
which, although they contained many dicta useful to both sides in the 
broad slavery controversy, did little to weaken the master’s legal claim to 
his Black. All that Lord Mansfield decided, as he himself carefully 
emphasized, was the narrow point that a slave, once in England, could 
not be forced to leave. But while he was careful to confine his ratio to 
the precise question before him, Mansfield did nonetheless cast grave 
doubt upon the general legality of the institution in obiter dicta that 
were later an important part of the case against slavery in New 
Brunswick.
The state of slavery is o f such a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which 
preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from 
whence it was created is erased from memory: it's so odious, that nothing can 
be suffered to support it, but positive law.1*
That Somerset's case did not abolish slavery in England is 
dramatically illustrated by the fact Lord Mansfield himself died a slave 
owner twenty-one years later.13 Indeed, his decision in Somerset v. Stewart 
only fuelled the controversy, providing support both for those who 
defended slavery and for those who wished to strike it down. The case 
itself and the pamphlet literature which immediately sprang up around it 
did, however, serve to coalesce still further the anti-slavery lobby in 
Britain. In the 1780’s a British Abolition Committee was established, 
which by the 1790’s, was causing abolition bills annually to be introduced 
into Parliament.14 Finally, in 1807, the anti-slavery forces won legislative 
abolition o f the slave trade in the British Empire, and, three decades 
later, the progressive phaseout of slavery itself.
In the United States
The fact that the final abolition o f slavery in the United States was 
not effected until the 1860’s tends to obscure the fact that slavery was 
abolished or was being phased out of all of the Northern and Middle 
states by 1804, and in many cases, substantially earlier. One cause of this 
early flowering of anti-slavery sentiment was the fact that slavery as an 
economic form was relatively unim portant outside the South. The 
crucial factor, however, was probably the intellectual and moral climate 
created in the Northern colonies — especially New England — by years 
of politicizing revolutionary turmoil. In the long, transform ing pamphlet
11Supra, footnote 10, at 510. In The Problem of Sltfvtry in the Age of Revolution (C<ornell: Ithaca, 1975), at 
47fi-77, David Davis argues that there is a significantly more accurate version o f Mansfield’s remarks; 
but, having been long ignored, it is irrelevant for the present purposes.
,3F.O. Shvllon. Black Slaves in Britain (Oxford U.P.: London, 1974), at 234.
'4Sufna, footnote 4, at 273, 321.
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campaign that preceded the outbreak of armed rebellion no argum ent 
was more frequently urged upon the American colonists than that 
submission to British impositions on their “liberties” would reduce them 
to a condition of “slavery”. According to the most eminent student o f 
the propaganda war:
"Slavery” was a central concept in eighteenth-century political discourse.
As the absolute political evil, it appears in every statement o f political 
principle, in every discussion of constitutionalism or legal rights, in every 
exhortation to resistance.'*
By classifying British policy as a conspiracy to reduce them to the status 
of slaves the colonists could invoke the law of “nature and nature’s God” 
to justify overthrowing the existing regime.
While the American colonists feared becoming slaves to the British 
and justified their resistance to established authority in terms of their 
rights under nature, they were singularly unwilling to apply the same 
logic to the case of their Negro slaves. It is one of the sharpest ironies of 
the revolutionary era that Thomas Jefferson, who inserted in the 
Declaration of Independence the principle that “all men are created 
equal” with an inalienable right to “life, liberty & the pursuit of 
happiness”, himself continued a slave owner for the rest of his life. 
Indeed, even the constitution of the new republic indirectly recognized 
two categories of Americans: free men and “all other persons”.
Although the Patriots in general were not so consistent with their 
libertarian principles as to make abolition of slavery a matter of policy, 
many colonists did nonetheless feel the awful inconsistency of revolting 
against a “slavery” infinitely less harsh than that which they themselves 
were inflicting upon their brethren of colour. It was inevitable that they 
would make the revolutionary rhetoric o f liberty serviceable in the 
abolitionist cause. Its effects were perceptible almost immediately. 
Vermont ended slavery by legislative act as early as 1777. In 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire the judges brought about the same 
result in the 1780’s. All of the other colonies north of Virginia soon 
followed suit; the last to enact a form of legislative abolition were New 
York in 1799 and New Jersey in 1804.
The abolitionist breakthrough was, however, somewhat less dramatic 
than it might seem. In all but Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
slavery, when abolished, was ended only in futuro. All slaves born before 
the abolition date were to continue in service, in many cases for life.16
“ Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Ongms of the American Revolution (Harvard: Cambridge, 1967), at 232.
‘•The best treatment o f this earlier phase o f the U.S. abolition movement is A rthur Zilversmit, The First 
Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North (U. Chicago: Chicago, 1967).
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In the Canadas and Nova Scotia
O f Britain’s major North American colonies remaining after the 
Revolution the first to take action against slave-holding was U pper 
Canada. In 1793, the General Assembly enacted, not without 
considerable opposition, that thenceforth no more slaves could be 
introduced or created in the province. Like some of its neighbouring 
United States jurisdictions, however, Upper Canada condemned slaves 
already in the province to serve out their life in bondage. Indeed, the 
law copied some of the earlier American legislation which actually 
discouraged manumission by requiring that masters post security lest 
freed slaves become a public charge.17
In Lower Canada there was also a legislative attempt to phase out 
slavery in 1793, but the bill died on the Table. It was, rather, the firm 
judicial policy of James Monk, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 
Montreal, which effectively doomed the institution in that colony. In 
cases in 1798, and, especially, in 1800, Monk denounced slavery and 
showed that he was determ ined to free every Black brought before him, 
if not on a technicality, than on an outright misconstruction of the law.
The pro-slavery forces counter-attacked by introducing into the Lower 
Canadian Assembly a gradualist abolition bill patterned after those in 
U pper Canada and many of the United States, which would have 
legalized the status o f at least those slaves already held. But measures to 
this effect failed of passage in 1800, 1801, and 1803. Caught between 
judicial activism on the one hand and legislative intransigence on the 
other, slavery in Lower Canada withered away.18
It was Nova Scotia’s judges, rather than its legislators, who took the 
active part in ending slavery, but the Supreme Court’s record is 
considerably less forthright than that of its Lower Canadian counterpart. 
Chief Justice Sampson Salter Blowers, writing in 1800, noted that the 
question of Negro slavery had been “often agitated here in different 
ways” but that the courts had always taken care to circumvent the issue. 
O f the judicial policy of his predecessor, Sir Thomas Strange, Blowers 
wrote that he had “dexterously avo:ded an adjudication of the principal 
point; yet as he required the fullest proof of the Master’s claim in point 
of fact, it was found generally very easy to succeed in favour of the 
Negro by taking some exception collateral to the general question, and 
therefore that course was taken”.19 The reason for the dissimulation was 
that Strange “wished rather to wear out the Claim gradually than to
11Ibtd.. at 100-02.
‘•Blowers to Chipman, 7 Jan. 1800. P.A.C., Lawrence Collection, M.G. 23 DI Ser. 1, Vol. 1
ITWinks, supra, footnote 2, at 96-98.
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throw so much property, as it is called, into the air at once”. Blowers 
himself was continuing that policy.20
Nova Scotia was the only one of the major British North American 
colonies to give a form of statutory recognition to slavery. A i 762 law 
for the regulation o f inn-keepers restricted the amount of credit that 
might be extended to, inter alia, a “negro slave”.21 Blower’s handling of 
this statute, albeit in a confidential letter rather than a published 
decision, is instructive. Such legislative recognition might have been 
viewed as precluding a challenge to the lawfulness of slavery as a 
principle. Yet to Blowers the passing reference to slaves in the 
inn-keepers law was “merely a description of a Class of people existing 
in the province” and not a “recognition of the Law of Slavery”. He 
implied that this was the opinion of the generality o f Nova Scotia’s 
lawyers.22
The most notable of the province’s slave cases arose when Colonel 
James DeLancey of Annapolis sued William W orden in trove’, for 
harbouring an escaped slave. Successful at trial, DeLancey’s suit was 
overturned on appeal, and he died without an opportunity to take 
further action in the m atter.23 Nevertheless, one of DeLancey’s lawyers, 
Joseph Aplin, did cause to be published the essence of his defense of the 
master’s claim, complete with a supporting statement from the English 
Attorney-General, Sir Edward Law.24 If  one excepts Ward Chipman’s 
unpublished 1805 Brief, Robin Winks is correct in styling Aplin’s 
pamphlet “the most extensive legal defense o f slavery ever offered in 
British North America”.25
tolbid. Blowers wrote:
Since I have been Ch. Justice a black Woman was brought before me on Hab. Cs from the Jail at 
Annapolis. The return was defective and she was discharged; but as she was claimed as a Slave, 1 
intimated that an action should be brought to try the right, and one was brought against the person 
who had received and hired the Wench. At the trial the pi. proved a purchase of the Negro in New 
York as a Slave, but as he could not prove that the Seller had a legal right so to dispose of her, I 
directed the Jury to find for the Defendt which they readily did. Though the question o f Slavery was 
much agitated at the Bar, 1 did not think it necessary to give any opinion upon it.
•'S.N.S. 1762 c .l.
’’Blowers to Chipman. n.d. [ 1800]: supra, footnote 19. See also the 1803 opinion of R.J. Uniacke in 
Brian Cuthbertson, The Old Atlomrt General: A Biography of Ruhard John Uniacke, 1753-1830 (Nimbus: 
Halifax, 1980) at 4.
"Sm ith, supra, footnote 2, at 110.
“ (Joseph Aplin], Opinions of Several Gentlemen of the Imw , on the Subject of Negro Servitude, in the Prm'ince of 
Nova-Scotia (Saint John. 1802).
Although the pamphlet was published anonymously in New Brunswick it was likelv Aplin who 
engineered its publication. The bulk o f the opinion reproduced in the pamphlet is his. the Odell Papers 
in the New Brunswick Museum contain the draught of a cover letter from Aplin to Blowers in which he 
privately transmitted the substance o f the pamphlet, referring to the possibility o f publishing it outside 
the province (Aplin to Blowers, n.d. [1802] Slavery Ms. C.B.), and the only known printed cop\ is to be 
found as an enclosure in Aplin to King, 16 Nov. 1802: Public Record Office, C.O. 226/18. The Preface 
may be by Jonathan Odell.
"W inks, supra, footnote 2. at 106.
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Such vigorous propagandizing by the friends o f slavery came to 
nothing in the face of a court determined to free Negroes at every 
plausible opportunity. The legislature, too, was deaf to the masters’ 
pleas. As early as 1787 a clause was inserted into a bill for the regulation 
of servants which would have had the effect of recognizing slavery; but, 
according to Chief Justice Blowers, it was “rejected by a great Majority 
on the ground that Slavery did not exist in the province and ought not 
to be mentioned . . 26 A move to recognize slavery under the guise of 
regulating it was similarly rejected in 1808.
Already in 1800 Blowers could write that the judicial policy of 
rejecting the masters’ claim upon the slightest pretext had “so 
discouraged them, that a limited Service by Indenture has been very 
generally substituted by mutual consent”.27 The last sale of a slave in 
Nova Scotia is thought to have occun-ed in 1807. Four years later an 
Anglican minister reported to his English sponsors that slavery had 
ceased to exist in the colony.28 While this is almost certainly an 
exaggeraiion, it does suggest that in the first decade o f the nineteenth 
century slavery in Nova Scotia was on the verge of extinction.
THE SLAVE ISSUE IN NEW BRUNSWICK
Although slaves were held in what is now New Brunswick by both 
the pre-expulsion French and the pre-Loyalist English, it was not until 
the spring of 1783, with the arrival of the first fleet o f loyal refugees 
and disbanding soldiers, that there was any considerable accession of 
Black setders to the province. Many of them were free, having accepted 
the government’s invitation to desert their rebel masters (slaves of 
Loyalists received no such invitation); but many of them came as slaves. 
Absolute and relative numbers are elusive both because contemporary 
statistics regarding the Loyalist migration are unreliable and because 
such numbers as do exist fail adequately to distinguish between white 
and Black servants and between free Negroes and slaves. It is probably 
safe to say there were not less than one thousand Blacks in early New 
Brunswick and at least one-half of these were slaves.29
Since Blacks in early New Brunswick were commonly mentioned in 
official and quasi-official documents with reference to their colour, they 
appear in the public records o f the time as a highly visible minority; yet
“ Blowers to Chipman, supra, footnotes 19 and 22.
*’Ibid., footnote 19.
’•The most reliable statistics are reproduced in E.C. Wright. The Loyalists oj New Brunswick (The Author: 
Wolfville, 1955), at 247-49. but thev are incomplete. The compilation from which come the statistks 
reproduced in J.W. Walker, The Black Loyalists (Dalhousie U P.: New York. 1976). at M. is unreliable
’'Winks, supra, footnote 2. at 105, 107.
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references to them are so scattered and heterogeneous and the state of 
historical research so preliminary that it is impossible to give more than 
an impressionistic view of their early experience. It is, however, clear 
that even free Negroes were second class Loyalists. Doubtless this was 
due in part to the fact that many of them had become “Loyalists” merely 
to obtain their freedom and had made no contribution to the 
government cause;30 but it must also have been due to the fact that the 
concept o f a free Black was something o f a novelty in the 1780’s. Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick had one of the earliest considerable 
communities of free Blacks in the North Atlantic world.
From the very commencement of their life in New Brunswick the 
loyal Blacks were the objects of official and social discrimination. In 
August 1783, for example, when four companies of Black refugees 
arrived at the month of the River St. John they were “placed at a little 
distance” from the white refugees.31 In 1785, when the Governor-in- 
Council decreed the voting qualifications for the Colony’s first election, 
they carefully emphasized that “the votes of Blacks are not to be 
adm itted”.32 The charter of the City o f Saint John, granted the same 
year, accorded the status of Freeman to only “American and European 
White inhabitants”.33 Such of the free Blacks who received grants of 
land were allotted smaller tracts than the whites, and in inferior 
locations.34 This forced the majority of the non-slaves to become hired 
servants for their fellow refugees. Even here they were subjected to 
peculiar indignities. An 1811 visitor to New Brunswick remarked that 
“no white domestic would s i t . . . at table if degraded by the society of a 
black”.35 Their dream of a life as free men in a new land having 
been thus disappointed it is unsurprising that in 1791-92 well over two 
hundred of the free Blacks quit the province for Sierre Leone.36
No statute even recognized or regulated the existence or 
continuance of slavery in New Brunswick after the province was erected 
in 1784. This was greatly to the slaves’ advantage. It meant New 
Brunswick’s slaves did not suffer some of the disabilities that had 
prevailed in the old colonies. They could, for example, (at least 
theoretically) give evidence in court; they could intermarry with whites;
s#This was Lieutenant-Governor Carleton’s view: see Spray, supra, footnote 2, at 39.
*'Tyng to Watson, 6 September 1783: Public Record Office, W.O. 60/331.
**Carleton to Sydney, 25 June 1785: Public Record Office, C.O. 188/2.
3’Quoted in Spray, supra, footnote 2, at 34.
!,4lbuL. at 31-2? Walker, supra, footnote 29, at 31.
“ H ouard Temperley, ed., Gubbtru' New Brunswick Journals (King's Landing Corp.: Fredericton, 1980), at 
26-27.
•1*Supta, footnote 29, at 124. Had the opportunity to leave been as accessible as for the Nova Scotian 
Blacks the num ber o f departures would have been much higher.
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they were protected by the same criminal law against m urder or bodily 
harm. More importandy, the lack o f legislative recognition meant the 
slaves’ status was ambiguous. If the Nova Scotian judiciary was prepared 
to overturn slavery in the face of a 1762 local enactment explicitly recog­
nizing it — if the Lower Canadian judges were prepared to turn their back 
on generations of local slave holding — then surely the New Brunswick 
judges, faced with neither o f these impediments, would be prepared to 
do the same.
How often the judges o f New Brunswick were confronted by a 
question touching the lawfulness o f slavery is uncertain. Only the 
proceedings o f 1799-1800 are discussed in the various published 
commentaries. To this may now be added the Richard Hopefield case 
(R . v. Agnew) o f 1805-06. But beyond these a general search of the 
massive, chaotically-arranged Supreme Court archive for the period 
1784 to 1815 has turned up nothing. Yet there undoubtedly were other 
cases, for Ward Chipman noted in 1799 that the slave question had 
already “from time to time been under judicial discussion” and, the 
following year, that “this has been a question agitated from the very 
origin o f this Province”. The essentially collateral nature o f these early 
discussions is, however, confirmed by Chipm an’s further comment that 
the great question had “never yet received any final determination upon 
principle”.37 In 1800, in the course of his anti-slavery Brief, he provided 
the following overview of the early legal history of slavery in the 
province:
That some masters have brought slaves here is true, and that the slaves 
have, in some instances* continued with their masters without disputing the 
right of their masters to their service, is also true. But it must also be 
admitted that the slaves have in many instances controverted this right, and 
have been manumitted, or indented themselves voluntarily to serve for a term 
o f years upon condition of being discharged at the expiration of it.s§
. “The question”, added Chipman, “is now for the first time brought 
forward for a legal decision in this Court.” The proceeding was R. v. 
Jones; R. v. Agnew.
The driving force behind the 1800 test cases was not Chipman but 
his co-counsel in the abolitionist interest, Samuel Denny Street. Born, 
educated, and given his legal training in England, Street had been 
stationed in New Brunswick during the Revolutionary War in one of the 
colonial military units. After the peace he remained in the colony and, 
upon the organization o f the courts in 1785, he was called to the bar. At 
the time of the 1799-1800 proceeding he was a prominent member of 
the Opposition faction in the House of Assembly. As such, he was a 
political friend of one of the defendants, Stair Agnew, and the political 
enemy of his co-counsel, Solicitor-General Ward Chipman.
,TChipman to Blowers, 5 December 1799: supra, footnote 1; Jack, supra, footnote 2, at 182.
**Jack, supra, footnote 2, at 179-80.
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T hat Street was the moving force behind the abolitionist legal 
agitation in New Brunswick is beyond doubt. It was he who procured 
the habeas carpus writs in both o f New Brunswick’s known slave trials. As 
well, the following passage from an 1805 letter by W.F. Odell is at least 
suggestive of Street’s consistent identification with the anti-slavery cause.
Street has sued out another habeas corpus for James Hopefield (a Brother 
I suppose o f Dick) in the keeping of Dr. Clarke — so that I suppose we shall 
e ’er long have half the negroes in the Province on Record.3*
O f the events giving rise to the 1799-1800 proceedings litde of 
substance is known. It is, however, worth emphasizing, because it has 
been so often misunderstood, that two distinct cases were involved. The 
one fully argued before the Court was R. v. Jones, over the “Black 
woman Ann otherwise called Nancy” whom Caleb Jones had brought 
with him from Maryland in 1785. The other case, R. v. Agnew, was over 
the slave Mary Morton, whom Stair Agnew had purchased from William 
Bailey. R. v. Agnew was commenced simultaneously with R. v. Jones but 
was not carried to trial once the result o f the other proceeding became 
known.40
The writ o f habeas corpus in the Jones case was issued on 17 July 
1799 and the sufficiency of the return  came to trial in mid February of 
the following year. Counsel in the case comprised a numerical majority 
of all the lawyers at the New Brunswick bar. Opposing Street and 
Chipman were Attorney-General Jonathan Bliss and four junior 
members of the bar, three o f whom had articled with Chipman. It may 
be presum ed that all o f the counsel addressed the Court for 
Chipman noted soon after that, “[t]he cause was very fully argued and 
lasted two whole days”, and the Royal Gazette reported that “[t]he 
question of Slavery upon general principles was discussed at great 
length, by Counsel on both sides . . .”.41 Chipm an’s massive anti-slavery 
Brief, produced for the occasion, survives, and it is known that Jonathan 
Bliss defended the right of the master with an argum ent divided into 
thirty-two heads of discussion.
T he direct result o f the case was that Chief Justice G. D. Ludlow 
and Judge Joshua Upham (a slave owner) supported the sufficiency of 
Jones’ return alleging that slavery was lawful in the province. Judge 
Isaac Allen (a slave owner), who had allowed the habeas corpus writ to
’•O ddi io Chipman. 12 Nov. 1805: P.A.C., 1-awrence Collection, M.C. 23 Dl Vol. 3.
‘•■Ihr lev» dotum enis relative to R. \ . Jones and R. v. Agnew to escape the souvenir hunters will be 
lound in the Supreme 0>urt ret olds, R.S. 42. for 18(H) in the Provincial Archives o f New Brunswick.
I he * ru  and the return for R  v. Jones are printed in Jack, supra, footnote I, at 184-85, from 
«tiiiiem poian iopies made b\ Chipman and now in the U.N B Archives.
‘ 'Su^r.r, fo o tn o te  I : Royal (iaielle, 18 Feb. 1800.
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issue, and Judge John Saunders were o f the contrary opinion.4* The 
Court being evenly divided, no judgm ent was entered and “Ann 
otherwise Nancy” was returned to captivity.43
T he lawfulness of slavery in New Brunswick had not, however, been 
vindicated. The friends of slavery, evidendy alarmed at the uncertain 
state of the law following R. v. Jones, counterattacked in the General 
Assembly. On 6 February 1801 Stair Agnew, one o f the defendants in 
the proceedings o f the year previous, rose in his place in the House of 
Assembly to introduce “A Bill relating to Negroes”. Second reading, 
apparently without division, was granted on 12 February, and the Bui 
was sent into Committee-of-the-Whole. On the day following the 
Committee reported progress; but on 14 February Agnew withdrew his 
Bill altogether.44
Two versions of the Bill survive among the papers of the House of 
Assembly. Insofar as they agreed, both recited a 1790 Act o f the British 
Parliament (30 Geo III c.27) allowing persons removing from the United 
States to the King’s dominions to import their slaves, provided that 
masters were legally liable to support their slaves however acquired, and 
enacted that no conveyance or manumission of a Negro could dissolve 
this responsibility except it be registered.
Two aspects o f these provisions are especially notable. One is the 
fact that the Bills are an ill-disguised attempt to give direct legislative 
recognition to the existence of slavery in New Brunswick, thereby 
underm ining one of the most potent of the anti-slavery arguments 
urged before the Supreme Court in 1800. As such, the measure 
anticipates the similarly unsuccessful Nova Scotia Bill o f 1808.45 The 
second notable feature of these 1801 Bills is that they purport to be 
pursuant to the Imperial enactment of 1790, whereas their substantive 
provisions have only the most tangential relevance to it. The Act was 
invoked by the partisans of slavery to give the New Brunswick Bills a 
guise o f legitimacy. That the Imperial law was being used as mere 
window-dressing is the more evident when one considers that it dealt 
with United States’ citizens removing into the Empire after 1790,
4* Allen later freed his slaves as a result of the opinion he expressed at the trial. Saunders is not known 
to have held slaves in New Brunswick but he had owned many in pre-Revolutionan Virginia.
As a result o f the trial Stair Agnew challenged Judge Allen to a duel, which the latter declined. Ii is 
conitnonl) said that Street and J.M. Bliss, one o f the junior counsel lor the master, duelled as a result of 
the trial; but contemporary records show the Street-Bltss encounter to have taken place a month before 
the slave trial, arising from other legal proceedings See David Jack, "An Affair o f Honor" (1905) 
Acadiensis 173, at 176-77.
43As a result of the cloud on title raised b\ the discontinued R v. Agnew habeas corpus proceeding 
Agnew reconveyed her to William Bailey, who Ireed her in return for fifteen vears lu rther service.
“Journals o f the House of Assembly, 1801; Provincial Archives of New Brunswick. House of Assemblv 
Papers R.G. 2. S14-B9. SI4-B9.I.
4iWinks, supra, footnote 2, at 106-07.
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whereas the migration pattern affecting New Brunswick was entirely in 
the opposite direction.46
One of the draught Bills in the House of Assembly files would have 
gone considerably further. It declared that offspring o f slaves would take 
their status from their m other (as under the ius gentium) rather than 
their father (as under villeinage), it set a penalty for harbouring escaped 
slaves, and it provided the master’s right to his slave was exigible as 
personalty and not as realty. Finally, at the foot o f this longer version of 
the Bill was a clause, to be inserted into the provision governing female 
descent, which would have freed every slave born in the province after 
the passing of the Act, upon his attaining a certain (but unspecified) age. 
This clause was evidently introduced after the earlier portions of the Bill 
had taken shape.
One would expect that the shorter was the version of the Bill that 
was first introduced and that, when it aroused great opposition, the 
further clauses were added, some favouring the master, but with the 
effect o f abolishing slavery in futuro. The endorsements on the Bills, 
however, suggest the order of introduction was the reverse. Notwith­
standing this ambiguity it is clear that by 1801 the tide of popular 
opinion in New Brunswick was so strongly set against slavery that 
Agnew, a member o f the numerically dom inant Opposition faction in 
the Lower House, could not induce his Assembly colleagues to recognize 
that the province’s slaves were held lawfully.
The next development in the debate on slavery is a curious one. On 
28 July 1801 the Royal Gazette, acting at the request o f “A Constant 
Customer”, reprinted the text of the Imperial act of 1790 together with 
an analysis by a “worthy and learned Judge”. The thrust of the analysis 
was that the enactment amounted to “Legislative recognition” of the 
existence of slavery throughout the Empire, and that, in consequence, 
“[t]he slaves which the Loyalists took with them to their new settlement, 
were and are, to this moment, slaves”.47
There is no direct evidence from the printed passage that the judge 
who authored the opinion was a New Brunswicker, but there is little 
doubt the sentiments were those of John Saunders. The Saunders Papers 
in the University of New Brunswick Archives contain an undated copy 
of the opinion in Saunders’ handwriting, with such variations from the 
printed version as confirm that it formed the basis for what appeared in 
the Royal Gazette and not the reverse.48 That Saunders should harbour
“ See also Chipman's observation lo the Court in R. v. Jones, reproduced in Jack, supra, footnote 2, at 
184.
47The Royal Gazette had also reprinted the 1790 act, again at the request o f a “Constant Customer", on 
14 Jan. 1800, shortly before the R. v. Jones; R. v. Agnew cases were to be tried.
4'Saunders Papers (Miscellaneous n.d. #7): U.N.B. Archives.
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pro-slavery sentiments is not surprising. He came from Virginia and had 
petitioned the British Government for Loyalist compensation for the loss 
of, inter alia, twelve slaves stolen by the rebels. Yet Saunders is not 
known to have owned slaves in New Brunswick, and had been one of 
the judges who would have freed the Black in R. v. Jones a year earlier. 
Since there is no doubt that that case was argued squarely on principle 
and that one of the arguments in defense of slavery was based upon the 
act of 1790,49 it is difficult to account for Saunders’ conduct other than 
in terms of a genuine alteration in sentiment.
Apart from the publication in Saint John in 1802 of Joseph Aplin’s 
pamphlet in defense o f the masters’ cause in Nova Scotia, the next 
known incident in the legal debate on slavery in New Brunswick does 
not occur until 1805. On 6 February of that year Samuel Denny Street 
appeared before Chief Justice Ludlow and two of his associates to move 
for a writ of habeas corpus to produce a body of Richard Hopefield J r .50 
Since Hopefield's case is hitherto entirely unknown and since the factual 
circumstances giving rise to it yield a rare insight into the conditions 
under which Blacks were held in early New Brunswick, the background 
of the case merits sketching in some detail.
Stacey (Patience), a Negro woman, was born about 1765 in the 
province o f New York. At some point during the Revolution the master 
in whose house she was bom  sold her to Gabriel Fowler, and in 1783 
she was evacuated to the River St. John as part of his household. Fowler 
conveyed the slave to his fellow Loyalist, Dr. Joseph Clarke, who, in 
turn, sold her to Phineas Lovitt. While with the Lovitts Patience entered 
into a marriage relationship, the formality of which is unclear, with 
Richard Hopefield, Sr., a free black.
While Stacey was carrying their second child she (as she sub­
sequently deposed) was “sent by . . . Leavitt [sic] on board the Greyhound 
packet in order to be put on board a Brig lying off Partridge Island in 
which . . . she was to be taken to the West Indies and sold”. Upon 
learning that his wife was about to be carried off, Richard Hopefield 
submitted his predicament to Governor Carleton and by his “order" 
Patience was “sent for on shore and re-delivered to her . . . Husband and 
told she was free and might go where she pleased within the King's 
dominions”.51
Although Thomas Carleton, if he so acted, had exceeded his 
authority, Stacey Hopefield was suffered to live with her husband in
4*Chipman’s anti-slavery Brief attempts to refute the argument: see Jack, supra, footnote 2, at 184.
‘•Crown Causes (Ä. v. Agntui): Provincial Archives of New Biunswick R.G. 5 R.S. SOB #2.
‘ ‘Patience Hopefield’s deposition, 2 July 1805: Provincial Archives of New Brunswick R.G.5 R.S.42: 
Supreme Court Records, 1805. Although chronology is somewhat difficult to establish, the events 
described must have occurred in late 1784 or early 1785.
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Saint John “quietly and undisturbed and in the enjoyment of her 
liberty” for upwards of seven years. But about 1792, Dr. Clarke “came to 
town and seized on her by violence and carried her to Magerville 
[sic] . . .  where he kept her upwards o f two years and then (as she was 
informed) sold her to Mr. Joseph Hewlett o f Queen’s County”.52 Stacey 
Hopefield’s sad history would doubdess have gone the way of most other 
accounts of the slave experience in early New Brunswick but for the fact 
that the slave in behalf o f whom the 1805 habeas corpus was issued was 
the child with whom she had been pregnant at the time of her 
threatened abduction to the West Indies.
The formidable character to whom the writ was directed was 
Captain Stair Agnew, a leading member of James Glenie’s Opposition 
faction in the House of Assembly. Agnew had been the defendent in the 
second habeas corpus application of 1799-1800, and had sponsored the 
attem pt the following year to have slavery recognized by the General 
Assembly. At about the same time he had been indicted before the York 
County General Sessions of the Peace for “Cruel Treatm ent and abuse 
of two Negro Boys then his Servants”.53 Agnew caused the matter to be 
dropped by pledging in open Court to free them when they reached 
their twenty-first birthday. One of these boys was Richard Hopefield, Jr. 
When Agnew failed to keep his promise Street procured a habeas corpus 
in Hopefield’s behalf. The facts of his parentage became the subject of 
several detailed depositions because Street evidently placed weight on 
the fact that the senior Hopefield had been a free man. The defense 
countered by attempting to show that Hopefield’s parents had never 
been formally married, so that he had taken the status o f his mother 
rather than of his (free) father.
Although the facts in the Hopefield case are uncommonly complete, 
the stages in its legal progress are obscure. The full range of 
proceedings lasted from at least 6 February 1805 to 7 February 1806, 
and involved one (possibly two) habeas corpus applications, the 
prosecution of Agnew for making a false return to the initial writ (in 
alleging that Hopefield’s father was a slave), and a civil suit by Hopefield 
against Agnew for battery and false imprisonment. Street acted for the 
slave in all the proceedings, assisted on at least one occasion by Thomas 
Wetmore, who had appeared as a junior counsel for the master in 1800. 
Chipman, reversing his stance of five years earlier, represented Aenew 
throughout.
Hopefield’s civil suit seems not to have proceeded beyond the 
Declaration (Statement o f Claim) stage, probably because his claim f j r  
freedom had failed. Agnew’s criminal prosecution for making a false
” She was still living with the Hewlett« when her deposition was taken.
‘’Affidavits of Cornelius Thompson and John Coombs, supra, footnote 51; MacFarlane, supra, footnote
2. at 5$.
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return  ended in acquittal, apparently because his false information had 
been tendered innocently. More importantly, Richard Hopefield’s habeas 
corpus proceeding was unsuccessful. Although the minutes of the 
Supreme Court are both laconic and confusing it would seem the 
principal legal debate took place on 5 July 1805. T he Court records for 
that day report a “full argum ent”, although this may possibly have been 
on a procedural question connected with the case. In any event it is 
known that the broad principle of slavery was at some point debated, for 
Chipman produced a lengthy Brief in defense of the master’s claim 
which survives among the records of the Court.
Only three members o f the Supreme Court heard the proceedings: 
Ludlow, Allen, and Saunders. Had the last two adhered to the views 
they had espoused in 1800 the abolitionists would have carried the day; 
but Saunders had gone over to the other camp in 1801. The Court 
minutes are so terse that it is impossible to say with certainty what views 
the judges may individually have expressed in 1805. At one point, 
however, the entry for 5 July indicates a division of opinion on the 
bench — probably with Allen in the minority — and it is likely this was 
on the substantive question o f slavery or abolition.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SLAVE ISSUE 
Significance For The Slaves
Hopefield 's case was undoub ted ly  a legal trium ph  for the 
slave-owning interests. They had received a clear legal verdict in favour 
of the continuance of Negro slavery, something they could not have won 
from the General Assembly or from the courts of any of the other major 
British North American colonies. O f the four judges on the New 
Brunswick Supreme Court only one was an abolitionist. Faced with such 
a court it is not surprising that no subsequent slave cases can be found.54
There is evidence that slavery continued to exist in the province as 
late as 1816, when the last advertisement for a slave appeared in the 
Royal Gazette; and doubtless slaves were held for some time thereafter. It 
is true that in 1822 the New Brunswick government reported that there 
were no slaves in the province,55 but this cannot mean more than that 
there were no notorious instances where the Black’s status as a slave was 
perfectly unambiguous. Indeed, it is difficult to believe there were not 
still some theoretical slaves in New Brunswick at the time of the Imperial 
emancipation in the 1830’s, although none are known. The situation was 
probably the same in Nova Scotia and Lower Canada, notwithstanding 
judicial policy to the contrary.
S4I can find no evidence that Street’s habras corpus on behalf of Richard Hopewell’s brother, James, as 
reported by Odell (supra, footnote 52), ever proceeded further.
5*New Brunswick Blue Book, 1822, at 37: Public Record Office, C.O. 193/5, quoted in Spray, supra, 
footnote 2, at 27.
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But while scattered instances of legal slavery may have persisted in 
New Brunswick for a generation after Hopefield, any practical effects of 
legal slavery probably withered away, even in the face of the 1805 
decision to the contrary. By the first decade of the nineteenth century 
educated opinion was so decidedly against slave-holding in the Northern 
States, in the adjoining colonies of British North America, and in the 
Mother Country herself that a master’s claim would be effectively 
untenable before the community at large. The apparently vigorous 
assertion of the master’s rights in New Brunswick ought not to mask the 
fact that only two men, Stair Agnew and Caleb Jones, account for almost 
all o f the public manifestations of slave-owning after 1800. Both were 
notoriously pugnacious and erratic; they were not the kind o f men to 
bow to public opinion but to defy it. Apart from their activities there is 
little evidence of the continuance of slave-holding in nineteenth-century 
New Brunswick. Jones’ slave advertisement of 1816 ought to be 
contrasted with the “Negro’s Soliloquy” that had appeared in the New 
Brunswick Courier on 1 April 1815. Locally composed, it represented the 
poetical lament o f a southern Black longing for his African home. 
Conspicuously absent was any hint that Negro slavery existed by the law 
of the province in which the “Soliloquy” appeared.
Thus, notwithstanding the fate o f the slavery issue before the 
Supreme Court, it would probably be a mistake to suppose that New 
Brunswick public opinion on the issue differed significantly from that in 
the neighboring jurisdictions, or that slave owning was significantly more 
widespread. Should a New Brunswick slave have demanded his freedom 
there would have been little reason for someone other than a character 
like Agnew or Jones to have incurred the social stigma that would have 
been consequent on a refusal. A slave, once manumitted, would have 
had little economic option but to remain in the service of his former 
owner.56 Freedom would mean so little to the real relationship between 
the master and his servant/slave that it is likely few slaves would have 
been denied it in exchange for a pledge of service; and, conversely, it is 
not unlikely that some slaves never did ask for their freedom, and 
thereby became technically subject to the Imperial act of 1833.
Significance For The Judges and Their Class
If ending slavery would not have greatly embarrassed the masters 
then why did Judges Ludlow, Upham, and Saunders resist what they 
knew was the trend of events throughout the North Atlantic world? 
Invited to follow their brother judges in Nova Scotia, Lower Canada, 
and Massachusetts in a gradualist abolition programme, they elected to 
resist the intellectual current o f their time. They chose to confirm New
“ See Winks, supra, footnote 2, at 108, 110; Spray, supra, footnote 2, at 33-35; Walker, supra, footnote 
29, at 57, 122-23.
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Brunswick in a social hierarchy which had at its base a class of humans 
treated as chattels. They did so not accidentally or incidentally but 
deliberately and explicitly, after elaborate argum ent involving most o f 
the provincial bar. It is evident that something peculiar to their 
experience disposed them to value the masters’ right to property more 
highly than the Negroes’ right to freedom.
One early historian suggested that the response o f the British North 
American judges to the slave issue could usefully be analyzed with 
reference to their respective colonial origins: that judges (like Monk and 
Blowers) from Massachusetts and other New England colonies tended to 
be abolitionists, whereas those (like Ludlow) from New York and the 
other Middle Colonies tended to sympathize with the claims o f the 
m aster.57 In the case o f New Brunswick’s judges, however, this approach 
yields nothing: the abolitionist Isaac Allen was from New Jersey and the 
anti-abolitionist Joshua Upham was from Massachusetts.58 I do, however, 
think a plausible, if speculative, case can be made linking the judges’ 
indifference to the claims of liberty to their peculiar experience as 
members of New Brunswick’s Loyalist governing elite.
T he colony o f New Brunswick was carved out of Nova Scotia in 
1784 as an asylum for loyal exiles from the American Revolution. The 
typical Loyalist — those who came to New Brunswick were generally 
farmers and tradesmen fror.i New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut — 
did not differ significantly in political principles from the typical 
Patriot.59 Indeed, the great majority of Loyalists quietly made their 
peace with the new order. But for those who were compelled by the 
fortune of war or geography to make their loyalty conspicuous a quiet 
submission was precluded and exile was the only recourse. As one 
scholar has succinctly expressed it, the great majority of New Brunswick 
Loyalists “came because they could not stay”.60 T hat their intellectual 
baggage included political principles and techniques which, apart from 
republicanism, differed little from those of the Patriots is made 
dramatically plain by the tempestuous politics of early Saint John and by the 
province’s constitutional crisis of the 1790’s.61 I do not think, therefore,
•’Smith, supra, footnote 2, at 102-103.
••Robin Winks, who has surveyed the legal course o f the slave issue in British North America as a 
whole, discounts colonial origin as a key to explaining judicial response to the slavery issue: supra, 
footnote 2, at 110.
‘•Kenneth McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History”, in Louis Hartz, ed.. The Founding of New 
Societies (Harcourt, Brace: New York, 1964) 219-74, at 234-35; David V.J. Bell, “The Loyalist Tradition 
in Canada", in John Bumsted, ed., Canadian History Before Confederation: Essays and Interpretations 
(Irwin-Dorsey: Georgetown, Ont., 1972) 211-29, at 213-14.
“ George Rawlyk, “The Federalist-Loyalist Alliance in New Brunswick 1784-1815" (1977), 28 Humanities 
Association Review 142, at 142.
• ‘See MacNutt, supra, footnote 2, at 53-63, 94-117, and D.G. Bell “T he Reception Question and the 
Constitutional Crisis o f the 1790's in New Brunswick", (1980) 29 U.N.B.L.J. 157.
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that one can take the view that the Supreme C ourt’s response to the 
slave issue was merely typical of a fundamentally conservative consensus 
in New Brunswick society. Indeed, Ward Chipman asserted in 1800 that 
the general provincial opinion was against its “admission or toleration”.62
The men on the Supreme Court were not, however, typical New 
Brunswick Loyalists. One element in the judges’ matrix o f experience 
distinguishing them from the ordinary is the fact that they had all 
occupied positions of wealth and prominence in the old colonies. They 
were men who, because of their public standing, had been called upon 
to articulate an opinion on America’s controversy with Britain, and they 
had consciously chosen empire over independence. All had served the 
Government in a position o f military command, ensuring that they 
would not be allowed to co-exist with the trium phant Patriots. With 
mounting rage and sinking hearts they had watched the British bungle 
the long war and, even more unaccountably, lose the peace negotiations 
as well. In 1783 all were exiled from the old colonies, leaving behind 
their property, their heritage, almost their whole world. They faced 
ruination o f their fortunes and careers and, perhaps even more 
importantly, a dramatic dislocation in the social hierarchy. The very 
name Winslow or Ludlow or Saunders would command deference and 
access to the highest circles in Massachusetts or New York or Virginia, 
but it would command nothing for an exile in the Mother Country. Men 
born to play a large role on a small provincial stage faced the chilling 
prospect of obscurity. One can sense the anguish with which Ward 
Chipman (himself a future judge) wrote from London that he “had 
rather move in a reputable and respectable line in that Country [New 
Brunswick] with a competent subsistance, than with the same income, 
support the mortification of seeing in obscurity millions insulting me 
with their wealth in this Country [England]”.63
To such men their patronage appointment in the newly-erected 
colony of New Brunswick came as a godsend. It represented more than 
just the salvation of their careers and fortunes. It meant their former 
position in the colonial elite was restored — indeed improved. In a 
revealing expression of a sentiment probably typical of his class Edward 
Winslow (another future judge) exulted at his arrival in the new city of 
Saint John that he had immediately regained his proper place in the 
social hierarchy.
••Jack, supra, footnote 2. at 1980.
MChipman to Sewall, 9 July 1784: Sewall Papers, Public Archives o f Canada.
This aspect of the psychology of New Brunswick's early governing elite is also noted by Ann 
Condon in “ 'The Envy of the American States': The Settlement of the Loyalists in New Brunswick: 
Goals and Achievements” (Ph.D. thesis: Harvard University, 1975) at 291:
The original loyalist leaders . . . were intensely proud, self-conscious men. Although born in an 
apparendy safe, secure world, where the path to distinction was illuminated by a series of well placed 
markers, their lives had in fad  been characterized by flux, by a series o f  abrupt reversals and successes, 
over which they themselves had little control.
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[I] have adopted a style that would astonish you. There's not a man from this 
quarter that presumes to solicit from head Q uarters without my 
recommendation that I have effected some business for meritorious 
characters which has afforded me vast pleasure.*4
One of the most ambitious attempts to replicate the form er degree of 
gentility was that of Judge John Saunders, who amassed a vast New 
Brunswick estate, amounting to some twelve thousand acres, aptly 
named “The Barony”.85
O f all the Loyalists appointed to the New Brunswick governing elite 
in the 1780’s the most fortunate were the judges. Theirs were among 
the few salaries borne by the Imperial treasury. More importantly, they 
were given key positions in the government as well as the judiciary. All 
were appointed to the Legislative Council, in which capacity they could 
initiate bills and amend or reject those sent up from the House o f 
Assembly. They were likewise members of the Executive Council and as 
such advised the Lieutenant-Governor on the exercise of the royal 
prerogatives. The judges were thus at the very centre of the power 
structure, in the enviable position of interpreting the statues which they 
as legislators had helped frame.
In addition to the restoration of their economic and social status the 
New Brunswick experiment afforded the Loyalist elite an opportunity to 
vindicate — to the world and to themselves — the wisdom of the 
imperial system for which they had been martyrs. Eschewing the 
institutional laxity and indulgence of dissent that haa led to the downfall 
o f the old American empire, they determined to make the constitution 
of their new colony, in the words o f a future judge, “the most 
gentlemanlike one on earth”.66 Administered on firm, monarchical, 
authoritarian lines New Brunswick would quickly become the “envy of 
the America. 1 states”.67 To this end they entrenched legal, educational 
and religious establishments framed to reflect and reinforce an 
hierarchical social and political order.
If the concept o f New Brunswick as political as well as personal 
vindication is one key to an understanding o f the social attitudes o f New 
Brunswick’s governing elite another is the threatened collapse of their 
dreams in the 1790’s. Externally the attack was from the rise of 
democratic and atheistic discourse inspired by the French Revolution. 
Even in remote, obscure New Brunswick there was a Burkean 
outpouring of religious and civil jeremiads against the intellectual
“ Winslow to Chipman, in William Raymond, ed.. The Wmslow Papers (1901) (Gregg: Boston. 1972), at 
98
“ Isabel Hill, Some Loyalists and Others (The Author: Fredericton, 1977), at 123.
"Supra, footnote 64, at 100.
•7Ibtd.. at 193.
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currents o f the times.68 According to one pillar o f the governing elite, 
the principles of the French Revolution had “excited an alarm that was 
never known before”.89
This assault on the vitals of the established order was thought to 
have its local parallel in the growth of an Opposition faction, 
numerically a majority in the House o f Assembly in the 1790’s. The 
Opposition was captained by the brilliant, erratic James Glenie. The 
Government faction deeply feared his challenge to their otherwise 
absolute sway. With revealing hyperbole one member o f the elite 
denounced Glenie as a “most notoriously violent Democrat and Jacobin”, 
“one that would wish to overturn the Church and State".'10 Throughout 
the 1790’s and early 1800’s the ruthless warfare of Government and 
Opposition factions nearly brought the legislative process to a halt. Most 
of the Opposition’s grievances centred on the judicial system — the 
province’s reception date for English statutes, the monetary jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court, the locus o f Supreme Court sittings, and the 
political role of the judges. At the height o f the controversy the judges 
were denounced as being “much more dependent for their daily bread 
on the Minister o f the Crown than any menial Servant in the Province is 
on his Master”.71
To the impact o f these political and ideological influences on the 
collective mentalité o f the judges and their class, one must add the 
consciousness, general by the end of the eighteenth century, that the 
New Brunswick social experiment had failed. T he sense of hierarchy 
which the elite had dream ed of instilling in their new society had been 
frustrated by economic stagnation and the levelling effect o f the 
frontier. It was soon obvious that, far from becoming the flourishing 
“envy” of the revolted colonies, the Loyalist elysium was “sinking into a 
sort of lethargy”.72 Unable to provide their sons with a gentleman’s 
education or a patronage office, those members o f the elite who could 
afford it were forced to send them abroad. Those of the younger 
generation who were not so fortunate faced the prospect o f becoming
•'Some examples are given in Sidney Wise, “Sermon Literature and Canadian Intellectual History”, in 
Bumsted, supra, footnote 59, 254, at 258-64.
•'Jonathan Odell, "Reflexions on the importance o f Religion as a Support to the Civil Authority, and of 
national virtue as a means o f national defense. [A sermon preached at] Christ-Church, Fredericton, 
Friday 26th June 1795, being the day appointed by Proclamation for a General Fast”: N.B. Museum, 
Odell Papers, Packet 15.
’•Lyman to Winslow, supra, footnote 64, at 420; Lyman to King, 15 April 1795: Public Record Office
C.O. 188/6.
TI“To a Freeholder o f York County”, The Review No. V, Royal GautU, 21 August 1795.
Predictably, their friends responded that such attempts to “villify and degrade" the Supreme Court 
and "render it contemptible” were motivated by “a wish to throw down distinction, to poison the public 
mind, to awaken it to groundless jealousies and fears, and to introduce . . .  all the dreadful anarchy and 
horrors" that had already ruined France: "The Review No. V", Royal GautU, 1 December 1795.
T’Winslow to Sewall, supra, footnote 64, at 709.
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merchants or farmers, leading one observer to note sadly that “the 
present rising generation are certainly inferior to their parents in every 
respect that relates to manners and good society”.73 New Brunswick was 
a country in which the yeoman farm er might greatly prosper by the 
sweat of his brow; but a gentleman, dependent for his ease upon a small 
pool of highly-priced wage labour, faced gradual ruin. The failure of 
the hierarchical dream  had a conspicuous symbol in John Saunders’ 
“Barony”, into which the judge had sunk thousands of pounds. Unable 
to attract a tenantry in a country where free land was abundant, his 
mansion house soon stood “in the midst of a wilderness of his own 
creation, without a neighbour or a practicable road, and his cleared 
lands . .  . growing again up into forest”.74
A generation after 1783 Saunders and the small governing circle of 
which he was a part faced the unhappy realization that New Brunswick 
could not support a graduated hierarchy o f classes. After the first 
generation, those with superior pretensions were distinguished from the 
nerd only by their access to crumbs of imperial and local patronage. 
Consequently, it was complained, “the poor are not educated to respect 
the rich as in Europe”. “On the contrary, the wealthy who are ambitious 
vie with their competitors in servility to the vulgar. No man is bred up to 
esteem  any th ing  bu t w hat conduces to ga in ” .75 T h e  typical New 
Brunswicker was simply “adverse to subordination”, and, given the 
province’s simple economic base, the attitude was irresistible.
By the early years of the nineteenth century, when the judges of 
New Brunswick were called upon to retain or abolish Negro slavery, the 
feeling was general that their larger social vision o f a model colony in a 
new British Empire was gravely imperiled. The contagion of the French 
Revolution threatened their world from without, and a powerful 
Opposition faction made their life miserable within the colony. Equally 
alarming was the prospect, quite discernable by 1800, that the Loyalist 
settlers of New Brunswick would not attend the Established Church, 
vote for Government candidates, tenant great estates, or reverence their 
betters. Against such a threatening background the decision of three 
members o f the colony’s aging Supreme Court to affirm a society with 
Negroes at its legal as well as its social base can plausibly be viewed as a 
statement in symbolic terms. It solemnly reiterated the old notion that 
God had appointed some to be great and some to be low; and in a 
society like that of New Brunswick in which the position of the great was 
precarious, it may have been with considerable gratification that three of 
the judges ensured, as a matter o f law, that the province’s Negroes 
would continue to be very low indeed. Others might be infatuated by the
'l*Supra, footnote 35, at 27.
,4I b td a t  5.
at 55-56.
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seductive principles that were underm ining the very pillars o f the North 
Atlantic civilization, but the New Brunswick judges would seize the 
opportunity to protest against the intellectual current of the times.
Had these same men held their positions in a more pluralistic and 
sophisticated context like that of Massachusetts or Nova Scotia or Lower 
Canada they might well have found it politic to hold for abolition. Had 
New Brunswick’s social experiment shown greater signs o f success it 
would have been correspondingly less tempting to make a symbolic point 
with the Negroes. But situated in an obscure colony at a time when 
general attention was directed to the Empire’s struggle with Napoleon, 
the judges were free to obey their more basic social instincts with 
self-confidence. Paradoxically then, while the gesture of retaining slavery 
against the tide of abolitionism says little about the practical condition of 
the province’s Blacks, it yields a revealing insight into the collective 
conscience o f New Brunswick’s governing elite a generation after the 
Loyalist experiment had begun.
APPENDIX I 
Ludlow's Pro-Slavery Rationale
T he following summary o f Chief Justice Ludlow’s decision in favour o f the 
rights o f the masters is taken from Ward Chipman’s letter to S.S. Blowers of 27 
February 1800 (supra, footnote 1). Only a small portion is printed in Jack, supra, 
footnote 2, at 150.
O ur Chief Justice is very strenuous in support o f the Masters right as being 
founded in immemorial usage and custom in all parts of America ever since its 
discovery. He contends that customs in all Countries are the foundations of laws 
and [that from it they] acquire their force; that there was a system of laws in 
every British Colony regulating Slavery under the idea of its existance 
independently o f those laws, and that there never was a law in any o f the 
Colonies directly establishing it; that Negroes when first imported into the 
Plantations were considered as Villeins in Gross, and were afterwards by [illeg ] 
local laws in some o f the Colonies made regardant; that the legal presumption in 
the Colonies was always against the Negro, unless he could shew a manumission; 
that in Carolina by their original Charter framed by the great l/u k e  the 
importation o f Slaves was prohibited, but that after a short experiment they were 
obliged to give it up, after which slaves were imported there without any positive 
law to authorize it; that this Custom is so universal that the Courts are hound to 
take notice o f it. That this being the established universal Custom in the 
Colonies, and as such having acquired the force of law; [that] at the time Nova 
Scotia was settled Proclamations were issued to encourage Settlers to lx* there
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from the older Colonies, inconsequence o f which these Settlers carried with them 
their Slaves, which they have continued to hold, without any legal decision 
against their right; T hat the several Acts o f Parliament, and the Courts in 
England in their adjudications recognize Slavery as being established and made 
lawful by the universal custom in America; that as all the acts o f the Colonial 
Assemblies are sent home for the approbation of the Crown, it must have been 
known in England that there was no law directly establishing it; that the Judges 
therefore never could have held slavery as lawful in the Colonies if they had not 
recognized it as legally established by universal usage and Custom independently 
o f Colonial Acts o f Assembly, and he relied much upon the Stat. 7&8 W3 C22 s9 
as implied recognition o f the usages and customs in the Colonies as having the 
force o f law, if not repugnant to the provisions of Acts o f Parliament relating to 
the Colonies. This as nearly as I can recollect was the general train and scope of 
his reasoning. It is predicated altogether upon the hypothesis that no law was 
ever made in any of the Colonies directly establishing Slavery. How this fact is I 
know not nor shall I undertake in a letter to discuss this reasoning, altho’ I 
confess it appears to me to be subject to many insuperable objections and rather 




It would be a mistake to pass over the actual arguments employed in the 
slave debate, and in the paragraphs that follow they are sketched in summary 
form. They warrant at least a passing notice if for no other reason than that, 
apart from Joseph Aplin’s 1802 pamphlet, they are the only known surviving 
literature o f their kind in British North America. In that sense, the New 
Brunswick productions necessarily have a certain representative value to the 
legal historiography o f early Canada. This literature is also worthy of 
consideration because it illustrates how lawyers in the New Brunswick 
community coped intellectually with one of the most fundamental issues any 
advocate could face. Although composed under the handicap of limited library 
resources and primarily as aids to the memory rather than finished productions 
for the public eye, the legal briefs do give an insight into the intellectual and 
literary tools brought to New Brunswick by those who laid the province’s legal 
foundation.78
Since Ward Chipman authored the great bulk of the surviving literature on 
slavery in New Brunswick his legal formation is o f some interest.77 Born in 1748. 
the son o f one o f Massachusetts’ most eminent lawyers. Chipman stood a 
respectable sixth in the social hierarchy o f his class at Harvard. After a brief
T*For example, in the course o f  preparing his anti-slavery Brief Chipman told Blowers. "W ith respect to 
the question at large we are very deficient here in any treatises upon it. having no public library and but 
indifferent private ones and those very much scattered": supra, footnote 37. Chipman's principal sources 
were Blackstone. Montesquieu, Coke, and the reported cases.
"A lthough Chipman was one of the leading figures in early New Brunswick historv and left an 
extensive personal correspondence, he lacks a respectable biography. T he best overviews of his career 
are P.A. Ryder, “Ward Chipman Sr.: An Early New Brunswick Judge" (1959). 12 V.N.B.LJ. 65 and the 
sketch in 17 Sibley's Hari'ard Graduates (Mass. His. S<*.: Boston. 1975) 369
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experience at teaching he studied law in the office o f his patron, the 
Massachusetts Attorney- and Advocate-General, Jonathan  Sewall. (It is 
interesting to note that Sewall had acted unsuccessfully as counsel to the slave in 
one of that Colony’s early notable trials o f the issue.78) Although Chipman has 
left no substantial account o f his legal education, his chance remark that the time 
he had spent in pursuing a particular civil law treatise was “litde better than 
thrown away, for not an idea remained upon my mind’’79 is reminiscent o f the 
comment o f his contemporary, John Adams, whose legal study consisted of “Old 
Roman Lawyers and Dutch Commentators’’.80 Such remarks indicate how 
philosophical in orientation a legal education in the late eighteenth century 
might be, an education which would equip a man like Chipman to come to grips 
with an issue as profound as slavery.
Chipman’s early career prospects were blighted just as he became 
professionally qualified when revolutionary turmoil closed the Massachusetts 
courts. His open support o f the cause of government made his continuence in 
Massachusetts impractical, and when the British Army evacuated Boston he 
accompanied them into exile. Setting down in New York, Chipman managed to 
combine military service with some private legal practice. In 1784, with the war 
lost and so many thousands of loyal exiles planted in what became the new 
colony o f New Brunswick, Chipman’s services and ability were recognized, if not 
rewarded, with the unremunerative office of Solicitor-General.
Between 1784 and his appointment to the Bench in 1809 Chipman was 
intimately connected with the leading political and legal causes of the day. 
Throughout the 1790’s he was prominent amongst the embattled Government 
faction in their long constitutional war against James Glenie, Samuel Denny 
Street, Stair Agnew, and their Opposition faction. It is, therefore, somewhat 
ironic that he should have joined forces with Street in the habeas corpus 
proceedings of 1799-1800.
Chipman’s supposed opposition to slavery is generally cited as one of the 
chief glories of his career. He himself boldly characterized his position as that of 
a “Volunteer for the rights o f human nature”.81 David Jack, introducing the 
published version o f the anti-slavery Brief, portrayed his role as:
[N]either expecung nor receiving rem uneration, and simply and solely as 
a labour of love, [he] undertook to devote all his knowledge and mental 
energies to help to obtain liberty for the slave Nancy [sic] Morton, and 
faithfully fulfilled his undertaking . . .  .
It is most probably safe to state that the burden of preparation for 
argument on behalf of the slave rested on Mr. Chipman’s shoulders, although 
Mr. Samuel Denny Street was his associate counsel . . .®2 .
’•See John Adams' minutes of the argum ent in Newport v. BiUmg (1768), reproduced in L.K. Wroth and
H.B. Zobel. eds., 2 Legal Papers of John Adams (Harvard U.P.: Cambridge, 1965), at 55-57.
’•Chipman to Sewall, 2 May 1790: P.A.C., Sewall Papers M.G.23 GII 10 vol. 3.
'•Q uoted in G.W. Gawalt, "Massachusetts Legal Education in Transition” (1967) 17 Am. J. Legal His. 27, 
at SI. Adams' principal was James Putnam, one of the first judges of the New Brunswick Supreme 
Cxturt. *
• 'Supra, footnote 37.
“ Jack, supra, footnote 2, at 146-47. See also SMey, supra, footnote, 77, at 378, Winks, supra, footnote 2, 
at 108, and Spray, supra, footnote 2 at 23.
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Such adulation rings rather hollowly against the fact that five years later 
Chipman appeared in opposition to “the rights o f human nature” in Hopefield's 
case. It is conceivable he took a role in the proceedings of 1800 as a means to 
bring himself to the attention of the Imperial authorities, to whom he was 
looking for a judicial appointment. Yet it is likely Chipm an’s role in joining with 
his political enemy Street in the labourious and unremunerative habeas corpus 
applications was actuated by humanitarian if not abolitionist sentiments.
Jack was also mistaken in supposing Chipman’s role was the major one on 
behalf o f the slave. It was Street who initiated the proceedings, with Chipman 
apparendy joining some months later when he commenced a correspondence on 
the subject with Chief Justice Blowers o f Nova Scotia. Chipman may indeed have 
carried the major part o f the argument in Court but there is no evidence o f this, 
apart from the fact his Brief has survived and Street’s has not. T hat Chipman 
had the junior role in the abolitionist cause is also suggested by the fact that, 
shordy after the 1800 trial, he wrote that he had been given to understand the 
cause would be recommenced through a false imprisonment action.83 Had he 
been the prime mover in the business he would have known personally. That 
Chipman’s committment to the abolitionist cause proved less than whole-hearted, 
is not, o f course, to his discredit; it is emphasized merely to rectify a widely-held 
misconception.84
No one who reads Chipman’s private correspondence or his chance 
surviving poetical effusions or his one known political pamphlet can doubt that 
his was an intelligence of a high order. As is the case with others o f his circle like 
Edward Winslow and Jonathan Odell, the depth of his intelligence and 
accomplishments become evident only on those few occasions when events in the 
small New Brunswick community called forth the refinements acquired in the 
more genteel world o f the Old colonies. The problems presented by the slave 
issue were one such occasion.
One cannot approach Chipman’s two Briefs o f Argument expecting to find 
either polished treatises or impassioned polemics. The constraints o f the occasion 
and the medium and the scarcity of library resources precluded any such 
production. But judged as legal arguments within the context o f the time and 
place, they are not only intellectually respectable within the conventions of the 
issue they address, but, more importantly, they give strong indications of original 
thought. What appear at first impression to be two Briefs constructed from a 
long series o f quotations linked by a few strands of editorial commentary on 
closer inspection are seen to feature arguments tailored to the slave issue directly 
as it touched New Brunswick — arguments which, by their very nature, 
demanded a high degree o f ingenuity.
tsSupra, footnote 1.
MT here is an interesting parallel in the fact that the eminent barrister John  Dunning, counsel for the 
master in Somerset’s case, had earlier appeared in behalf o f a slave: sufna, footnote 14, at 64, and that 
Attorney-General Bliss, counsel to the master in the 1800 proceedings, had earned his Harvard M.A. by 
preparing an argum ent that "The Offspring of Slave are not Born Slaves": see 15 Sibley (1970), supra, 
footnote 77, at 355.
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The Case For The Master
The extant literature illustrating the defense of slavery as formulated by 
New Brunswick’s early lawyers and jurists consists o f three documents: Chief 
Justice Ludlow’s judgm ent in R. v. Jones as precised by Ward Chipman, Judge 
Saunders’ 1801 commentary on the Imperial statute o f 1790, and Chipman’s 
1805 Brief in R. v. Agnew.85 The case for the masters summarized hereunder 
observes the pattern of presentation in Chipman’s Brief, introducing material 
from the other sources where appropriate.
Both of Chipman’s Briefs open conventionally, as if their author thought he 
was obliged to pay his respects to the traditional intellectual and moral issues 
raised by the great question before he moved on to those which he had devised 
to fit the particular case of New Brunswick. In the case of his Brief in defense of 
slavery Cnipman commenced with a series o f fifteen quotations from the Old 
Testament and six from the New. He read them to the Court to demonstrate
that the sacred scriptures of the old and new testament authorize the Slave 
trade: that under the law, the slave trade is in a manner commanded by God 
Almighty and under the Gospel dispensation the holding in slavery [of those] 
purchased as Slaves is not only mentioned by our blessed Saviour and his 
Apostles without censure or disapprobation, but rules are given by Saint Peter 
and St. Paul how slaves ought to demean themselves to their masters.*6
The content of the argument is predictable. It is an attempt to forestall the 
inevitable argument that slavery is contrary to fundamental law by showing that 
the institution was accepted by the founders of the Jewish and Christian 
religions. In this regard Chipman shrewdly drew support from Scottish liberal 
philosopher John Millar’s anti-slavery treatise on The Origin of the Distinction of 
Ranks (1771) to emphasize that Christianity and slavery had co-existed from 
earliest times.
Chipman continued his work of underm ining the general abolitionist 
premise that slavery was repugnant to all basic law by showing that slavery “of a 
particular nature” was part of the ancient Common Law o f England. Relying 
extensively on Blackstone’s account o f the evolution of English villeinage 
Chipman pronounced it a form of “slavery o f the most degraded nature’’, and 
argued that, although it had fallen into desuetude, it had not been abolished. 
Edward Christian, he noted, had found a case on the subject decided as recently 
as 1618. Even Lord Mansfield in Somerset’s case had accepted the Lord 
Chancellor’s assertion in Peame v. Lisle (1749)87 that villeins might be extinct but 
the law o f villeinage remained. The implication was that Negro slaves brought 
into England from the colonies would be recognized as such to the extent o f the 
ancient regime of villeinage.
“ There is a sixteen-page fragment of a pro-slavery argum ent among the Aplin materials (supra, 
footnote 24) at the New Brunswick Museum. I'he production is anonymous and undated, although 
some of the leaves are watermarked 1798. Internal evidence suggests the document was prepared for 
use in oral argument in a Nova Scotia tourt. The argumentation is conventional.
" 't  nless otherwise noted all quotations are from the unpaginated Brief among the Supreme Court 
Keiords for 1802 at the Provincial Archives o f New Brunswick R.G.5 R.S.42.
■’2 hden 12»»; 28 K R 844
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In neutralizing the argument as to the supposed libertarian effect of 
Somerset's case on the status of slavery in England, Chipman had only to point to 
Lord Mansfield’s own emphasis that his decision was confined to the bare facts 
before him, viz., whether a master could force a slave to leave England, and that 
it did not pass upon the broad issue of the master’s claim to his slave’s services. 
In upholding the slave’s right to remain in England Mansfield had merely been 
reaffirming the ancient principle o f villeinage that the lord could neither kill his 
villein nor carry him out o f the realm. The result, concluded Chipman, was that 
a relatively severe form of slavery had indeed existed "even in the free air and 
soil o f England; that it is expressly sanctioned by the divine law, and recognized 
without censure or reproof by our Saviour and his Apostles”. “I t . . . still remains 
a part o f the Common law of England, if there were subjects upon whom it 
could operate."
When Chipman presented his case that the Common Law comprehended a 
very severe form of slavery his purpose was merely to counter the notion that 
there was something about slavery that was essentially abhorrent to English law. 
Its purpose was certainly not to argue that slaves were held in the colonies 
pursuant to the law of villeinage, a proposition which he was to deny vigorously 
in the final stage of his presentation. A second use served by a review of the law 
of villeinage was to lay the basis for a useful parallel between the English version 
o f slavery, which derived from English common law and which continued to 
exist until expressly abolished, and the system o f slavery as practised in the 
American colonies, which had also arisen without positive statutory establishment 
and which (he would argue) continued in America until such time as it was 
statutorily prohibited.
That such colonial customs not found in the Mother Country could lawfully 
exist had been impliedly recognized by Parliament in a 1696 enactment striking 
down any such customs which were repugnant to English laws touching the 
colonies.88 “It is obvious from this”, asserted Chipman, “that the laws o f England 
contemplate the legal existence of all such usages and customs in the Colonies as 
are not here declared void and that they recognize such customs as having the 
force of or being a part o f the Common Law of the Plantations.” The practice of 
enslaving Negroes was one such custom; nowhere established by positive law, at 
least at the beginning o f the colonies, it was everywhere practised.
This notion, that slavery in New Brunswick derived its legitimacy from 
“immemorial usage and custom in all parts of America ever since its discovery" 
which need not be derived from the law of the metropole, had been the basis for 
Chief Justice Ludlow’s pro-slavery opinion in 1800.89 At that time Chipman had 
dismissed it as “rather fanciful”90, “subject to many insuperable objections and 
rather making the law tor the occasion, than founding it upon any good 
authority”.91 He now proceeded to make it the cornerstone o f his case.
7&8 W ill c22 s.‘>.
**Supra, Appendix I. 
t0Supra. footnote 37.
*'Supra, footnote 1.
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Chipman’s most important evidence that slavery as practised in New 
Brunswick had indeed been “established by custom” in the American colonies 
was the fact that so many acts of the Imperial parliament and similar measures 
had “recognized and legalized” this usage. In the charter o f the Royal African 
Company (1661), for example, Negroes were expressly made an object o f its 
commerce, a right extended to all British subjects by an act o f Parliament in 
1750.92 If Negroes might be traded, did that not pre-suppose they might also be 
owned by their American purchasers? By an act o f 1732 slaves were expressly 
made exigible under the writ offieri facias and other forms of execution for their 
master’s debts.93 Did ot such a provision recognize and confirm the necessarily 
pre-existent lawful. > of slave-owning in the colonies? (Here Chipman 
overlooked the fac e provision affecting slaves had been expressly repealed 
nine years earlier.9 lo re  directly touching New Brunswick’s situation was the 
law of 1790 allov immigrants removing into the King’s North American 
dominions from th nited States to import their “negroes, household furniture, 
utensils", etc., free duty provided the same not be disposed o f for twelve 
months thereafter Here, then, was a law of recent date directed specially at 
the remaining • íes in North America unquestionably assuming Blacks were 
susceptible to , uership and sale. This was the provision that had apparently 
caused ]udvr jaunders to change his mind in 1801. By the very fact that it 
all'- Loyalists to import their slaves, he wrote, “[I]t acknowledges those
aíos when brought in to be what they were before, Slaves, because by 
i^rbidding them to be sold within the first year, it tacitly permits the sale of 
them after that period: but in what country can a negro be sold but in one in 
which Slavery is allowed by law?”98
Chipman did not claim that any of these acts of Parliament “established” 
slavery in the colonies. The essence o f his argum ent is that they merely 
“recognized” and “confirmed” and “sanctioned” and “contemplated” a 
pre-existing usage. In none of the present or form er colonies could he find an 
ancient law actually creating the condition of slavery. All enactments touching 
the subject, like that o f Nova Scotia, proceeded on the plain assumption that 
slavery already existed. Nevertheless, although no law had ever formally 
instituted slavery, had there ever been a doubt it was lawful? T o declare it did 
not legally exist in New Brunswick was tantam ount to denying its legality in any 
o f the British colonies; it was to contradict the basic assumption from which so 
many schemes o f legislation had proceeded. “Why should we”, Chipman 
rhetorically demanded,
at this day set outselves up as wiser than all the generations of mankind who 
have gone before us? as wiser than the maker of Heaven 8c earth who 
ordained 8c established the conditions among mankind . .  . ?
For the Supreme Court o f New Brunswick to deprive the owners of so much 
property acquired pursuant to Common and statute law
“ (1750) 23 GeoII c.31 (Imp.).
” (1732) 5 GeoII c.7 (Imp ).
•4(1796) 37 GeoII I c.l 19 (Im p).
»»(1790) 30 GeoIII c.27 (Imp ).
**Supra, footnote 48.
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would be in effect to repeal the Acts of Parliament made in this behalf, to 
violate the faith of the British Government pledged to every loyal inhabitant 
o f this Country and to trample under foot the most sacred tenures by w hich 
any property can be held or claimed in this Province.
This rhetorical flourish, one o f the few such passages in the Brief, closed the 
general part of Chipm an’s presentation. His one remaining argum ent, sketched 
at some length, dealt with the rule of inheritance given expression by the civil 
law maxim partus sequitur ventrem as it applied to slavery in New Brunsw ick. Such 
an argum ent was made necessary by the fact that Richard Hopefield’s mother 
had been a slave but his father had been free. Although the point itself is not an 
important one for present purposes, the argum ent by which Chipman sought to 
establish the result he desired — that Hopefield took the status o f his (slave) 
m other — is o f note. Because English villeins derived their status from their 
father Chipman was forced to make explicit what he had earlier only implied: 
that not only did colonial slavery not depend for its lawfulness on common law 
villeinage but also that the two were “altogether different”. “To apply, therefore, 
the maxims o f the Common Law o f England to a case not only not contemplated 
by that law but depending upon a foundation and principles utterly incompatible 
with that law would be the extreme absurdity.” It was the ius gentium, he argued, 
which governed the basic principles o f slavery in the American colonies, and the 
ius gentium as expounded by Pufendorf and other learned writers provided that 
slave issue took their status from their m other.97
Chipman’s Brief for the masters, which appears at first to be dominated by 
lengthy extracts from the w'ork o f others, presents on closer examination the 
development o f what may well be a novel line of argument on a difficult subject. 
Its thesis was that American slavery was part o f a colonial common law; and. 
while the germ o f this idea clearly originated with Ludlow in 1799 rather than 
Chipman in 1805, it was the latter who had occasion to develop it. While it is 
impossible to say this was an argument unique to New Brunswick, it is notable that 
Chipman could cite no English case in which it had been advanced.98 
Conceivably it might have been used in some o f the pre-Revolutionary slave 
cases o f which Ludlow or Chipman would have heard, but it would not have 
been reported. Certainly, judging from Chipman’s incredulous reaction when he 
heard it in 1800, it was something o f a novelty.99 And. according to Chief Justice 
Blowers o f Nova Scotia, “No Lawyer w ith us ever talked o f the Common Law of 
the Colonies as distinguished from that o f England nor would our late Chief 
Justice Strange, I think, have countenanced a position o f the kind”.100 Nor did 
Joseph Aplin in his well-argued pamphlet of 1802 adopt the position which he 
must have known Ludlow had expounded in the 1800 New Brunswick 
proceedings. Indeed, he used the various imperial statutes not as Ludlow and 
Chipman did — to show recognition o f a pre-existing state o f slavery — but as 
support for the quite different proposition that these enactments had actually
•’Colonial New York had established the principle by statute (Zilversmit, supra, footnote 16. at IS). The 
o ther northern colonies had apparently observed, but not legislated, the civil law principle.
••Such a position was, however, taken by Lord Stowell in R. v. Allen (The Slave Grace) (1827) 2 St. T r. 
(N.S.) 273, at 298-99 (Adm.). He. however, assumed, rather than argued, that the basis of colonial 
slavery was colonial custom, and cited no case in support.
••See supra, at footnotes 90 and 9 1.
‘••Blowers to Chipman, n.d. (1800): supra, footnote 19.
40 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
established slavery in the colonies.101 In sum, then, the defense of slavery as 
formulated in early New Brunswick may be significant to Canadian legal 
historiography not merely because it survives, not merely because it addresses 
one of the grandest of all legal questions, but also because it developed a fresh 
line of argum ent in defense of slavery, one uniquely consonant with New 
Brunswick’s colonial situation.
The Case For The Slave
The surviving literature presenting the abolitionist argum ent as developed 
in New Brunswick is less substantial than that supporting the masters’ case. It 
consists o f only Chipm an’s Brief prepared for the R. v. Jones; R. v. Agnew 
proceedings of 1800.102 Like its counterpart o f five years later the Brief is a 
lengthy series of quotations from largely predictable sources.103 But it is less 
successful than the later presentation in incorporating them into an overall 
argum ent that gives the impression its compiler is fully in control. It is only 
when he turns to considerations direcdy relevant to New Brunswick that 
Chipman argues with conviction. Elsewhere he presents all the “right" 
arguments, but in a largely mechanical way.
Chipman commences his case by reciting the Montesquieu-Blackstone 
response to the traditional attempts to give slavery a foundation in natural law. 
He also follows Montesquieu in rebutting the more vulgar defenses for slavery. 
Surprisingly, he does little to undercut the inevitable counter-argum ent — that 
slavery is countenanced by Holy Scripture. He addresses the question only with a 
short passage from Charles Molloy’s De Jure Maritimo (1676) to the effect that 
slavery in Christendom was now obsolete.104 Given the explicit recognition of 
slavery in the Bible he evidently thought this the best approach that could be 
taken.
Just as the “traffic in human flesh” could not be founded on natural law, so 
it could not be justified as a matter o f policy, Chipman urged. John Millar had 
shown not only that slavery was inefficient as an economic system but also that it 
corrupted the dispositions of the masters and the morals o f the whole society 
where it was introduced. Even if Black slavery might be justified on grounds of 
avarice in the West Indian colonies, it would be folly for the judges of New 
Brunswick to legitimate “a practice so derogatory to every principle of law and 
justice”.105
ia'Supra, footnote 24. at 8, 10-11.
1#*To this one might add the view Chipman attributed to Judge Allen (“strenuously insists that it is 
beyond the power of human laws to establish or justify": supra, footnote 50) and the sentiments 
attributed, probably inexacdy, to Allen and Saunders by the Royal Gazette o f 18 February 1800 (“that the 
Law upon that subject is the same here as in England and therefore that Slavery is not recognized by 
the Laws of this Province”).
l#1An exception to this generalization may be Chipman's extensive reliance on the 1771 edition o f Millar 
on Ranks. O f this work, C.D. Rice has written: "[i]t had no colonial edition, and there is at present no 
indication that it had any substantial impact outside Britain": The Rise and Fall of Black Slavery 
(Macmillan: Lm don. 1975), at 173.
,<MJack. supra, footnote 2. at 157.
,#sIbid, at 158.
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Chipman’s review o f the law of slavery as it was currently declared in 
England brought him to the long line o f conflicting authorities of which Somerset 
v. Stewart was the most notable. Chipman sought to give Lord Mansfield’s 
judgm ent the broad, abolitionist reading to which some of the dicta left it 
o p en .'08 But while it is understandable that a lawyer at a colonial bar would 
rehearse the English cases on the law o f slavery, these authorities really had 
little relevance to Chipman’s overall argument. Like his earlier canvass of 
natural law and public policy considerations, it seems to be material introduced 
not because Chipman thought it would have a direct bearing on the outcome of 
the case but only because it was an exercise expected of an opponent of slavery 
on such an occasion.
Chipm an’s case for the slave would stand or fall largely on his ability to 
convince the Court that even though slavery might be said to be lawful in the 
other North American colonies, it was not lawful in New Brunswick. To do so he 
would have to overcome the adverse implication o f the several British statutes 
which seemed to recognize the existence o f slavery in the colonies. This 
Chipman attem pted to do by resorting to the rather subtle argum ent that the 
acts o f Parliament in question did not actually institute slavery in the colonies; 
they merely recognized its existence in those “plantations in which it was 
[already] established”.107 The act o f 1790 for opening the slave trade to all the 
King’s subjects, for example, “did not establish the condition, but supposes it to 
exist by the provision of their [the colonies’] municipal laws”.108 Chipman neatly 
circumvented the force o f the 1790 provision for the bringing o f U.S. slaves into 
British North America by pointing to the requirement that any such importation 
could be made only under licence from the local governor, which provision 
might be “fairly considered as being inserted with a view to guard against any 
difficulty that might arise from bringing Negroes into a Province where slavery 
was not sanctioned by law”.109 This is disingenuous but at least a resourceful 
attempt to overcome a key statutory hurdle. “What can be more contrary to 
reason and to every principle o f justice”, Chipman demanded,
than to make the Acts of Parliament in the present instance operate to 
establish and inflict so severe a condition and penalty as slavery, in any part 
o f the dominions where no such condition existed, when the words can he so 
fairly construed to extend to those plantations only, where slavery was 
established by law, and where the nature o f the climate and of its products 
was thought to render the use of slaves unnecessary?"0
“No Act o f Assembly”, Chipman reminded the Court, “has ever passed in this 
Province in the smallest degree recognizing any such custom or condition as 
slavery......
Chipman reinforced this analysis by reference to the case o f Nova Scotia,
10*For the devek>pment o f the abolitionist interpretation o f Somerset (“neo-Somerset”) in the American 
courts see William W'iecek, “Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the 
Anglo-American World" (1974) 42 V. Chit. L.R. 86, at 118 et seq.




'"Ib id ., at 180.
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from which New Brunswick had recently been severed, and certain of whose 
laws and customs, it might have been argued. New Brunswick had inherited. In 
attempting to gain ground by trum peting the supposed fact that Nova Scotia, 
also, had never given legal recognition to the practise of slavery, Chipman was 
deliberately misleading the Court. He was well aware o f the 1762 law regulating 
the extension of credit to slaves, but he suppressed it, evidently successfully.112 
He might with equal effect and greater rectitude have cited the New Brunswick 
declaratory act of 1791, which had determined the operation of all Nova Scotia 
laws.113
If slavery could not be considered as established in New Brunswick by virtue 
of either Imperial or local statute, then could it be said to be lawful by the 
Common Law of England or the common custom of the American colonies? 
This latter point, Chipman knew, held particular attraction for Chief Justice 
Ludlow.
The short answer on both counts was the same, and was given eloquent 
expression by Lord Mansfield’s dicta in Somerset.
“Now, this custom of American slavery’’, says Lord Mansfield, “is o f such a nature 
that is is incapable o f being introduced on any reasons, moral or political. It 
is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.” And,
I may add, it is such an usurpation upon the natural rights of mankind that no 
hum m  laws can justify or support it.114
This was a potent argument. In addition to its respectability as a result o f its 
incorporation in Somerset's case, it had formed an essential basis o f one o f the 
leading Massachusetts decisions tending to the abolition o f slavery.115 And even 
if so odious a practise could be elevated to the status of law through customary 
usage, this particular custom certainly could not pass the common law test of 
existence since time immemorial.
Chipman’s presentation on behalf o f the slave, like his effort for the masters 
five years later, arrests the reader’s attention only when it deals with the great 
question as it relates specifically to New Brunswick. In both cases all o f the other 
points are dutifully raised, and none are argued in a m anner that seems poor; 
but it was obviously the practical application o f the slave issue to the situation of 
New Brunswick in particular that most engaged Chipman’s interest. If, in the 
end, his Brief for the masters appears the more impressive o f the two, it is 
probably because its argum ent respecting the lawfulness of slavery in the 
province is more complex and elaborated at correspondingly greater length.
Supra, footnote 1. Chipman confessed to Blowers that:
The principal difficulty on that [the master’s] side seemed to be that not finding any Act of 
Assembly o f your Province recognizing the condition o f Slavery there. Had the Counsel stumbled upon 
your Act passed in 1762 . . . the ronclusiveness of the reasoning upon their principles would have been 
considered as demonstrated. In searching your laws upon this occasion I found this clause, but carefully 
avoided mentioning it.
"»S.N.B. 1791 c.2.
1 l4Jack, supra, footnote 2, at 181.
l>iCaldwell v. Jenmson (1783): see J.D. Cushing, “The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in 
Massachusetts: More Notes on the ‘Quock Walker Case' " (1961) 5 Am. J. Legal His. 118, at 133. See also 
Blowers’ opinion supra, at footnote 22.
In all of the American colonies slavery existed before there were any municipal laws on the subject. 
When such laws were enacted they generally did not formally establish slavery; they merely regulated it 
on the assumption that it already had lawful existence. Because New Brunswick had neither sort of 
statute this distinction was not important to Chipman's case.
